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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Country ownership of reform programmes and the implications for conditionality</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Johnson, Omotunde E. G.</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">New YorkUS</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>UN</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2005</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>[5], 21 p.</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>Argues that if the policies voluntarily adopted by a country were sound and if those policies are expected to be fully implemented and sustained - barring certain unforeseen exogenous developments - then traditional (policy-based) conditionality is not necessary for timely repayment of the money borrowed from the IMF, the World Bank, or any other creditor.</abstract>
  <note>5/24/05 JOYD</note>
  <classification authority="udc">01.01.03 J732</classification>
  <recordInfo/>
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