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  <titleInfo>
    <title>A note on public debt, tax-exempt bonds, and Ponzi games</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Wigger, Berthold U.</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Washington]US</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>IMF</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2007</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>18 p.</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>Demonstrates that government can run a Ponzi game if the economy without public debt is dynamically efficient.  This becomes possible when the return on private bonds or equity is taxed and the government issues tax-exempt bonds.  Notes that unlike a traditional Ponzi game, the welfare effects of a Ponzi game based on the issuance of tax-exempt bonds are rather mixed.</abstract>
  <note>3/19/09 JOYD</note>
  <classification authority="udc">11.01.01 W655</classification>
  <recordInfo/>
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