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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Corruption dynamics : the golden goose effect</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Niehaus, Paul</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <dateIssued>2013</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <abstract>Argues that if there is some chance of detecting and dismissing corrupt agents then the principal can mitigate the problem by paying an efficiency wage. Focuses on the dynamic trade-off between extracting rents today and improving one's chances of surviving to extract rent tomorrow, the golden goose effect.</abstract>
  <note>12/30/13 SANDRAW</note>
  <classification authority="udc">Serial</classification>
  <recordInfo/>
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